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Abstract
Throughout history empires facilitated trade within their territories by building and secur-
ing trade and migration routes, and by imposing common norms, languages, religions, and 
legal systems, all of which led to the accumulation of imperial capital. In this paper, we 
collect novel data on the rise and fall of empires over the last 5000 years, construct a meas-
ure of accumulated imperial capital between countries, and estimate its relationship with 
trade patterns today. Our measure of imperial capital has a positive and significant effect 
on trade beyond potential historical legacies such as sharing a language, a religion, a legal 
system, or links via natural trade and invasion routes. This suggests a persistent and previ-
ously unexplored influence of long-gone empires on current trade.
Keywords Imperial capital · Empires · Trade · Long-run persistence · Gravity
JEL Classification F14 · N70
1 Introduction
Modern life flows on an ever-rising river of trade; if we wish to understand its cur-
rents and course, we must travel up its headwaters to commercial centers with names 
like Dilmun and Cambay, where its origins can be sought, and its future imagined.
William J. Bernstein in A Splendid Exchange (2008)
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The greatest expansions of world trade have tended to come not from the bloodless 
tâtonnement of some fictional Walrasian auctioneer but from the barrel of a Maxim 
gun, the edge of a scimitar, or the ferocity of nomadic horsemen.
Findlay and O’Rourke in Pwower and Plenty (2007)
Today’s countries emerged from hundreds of years of conquests, alliances, and down-
falls of empires. The long-run persistence of such historical episodes has been the focus 
of a new strand of literature in economics. For instance, Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 
(2016) show how the Reconquista, i.e. the series of conquests that led to the fall of the last 
Islamic state in Spain in the 15th century, explains differences in Spanish regional eco-
nomic development today. Another example is Wahl (2017) who argues that the persistence 
of Roman roads explains part of the development advantage of the formerly Roman parts 
of Germany.1
The aim of this paper is to uncover how the rise and fall of empires throughout history, 
from the Afsharid Dynasty to the British Empire, still influence world trade. To that end, we 
collect novel data on 5000 years of imperial history, construct a measure of accumulated 
imperial capital between countries, and estimate its relationship with trade patterns today.
Imperial capital can be thought of as norms, institutions, and networks that emerged 
during empires to facilitate trade and that may outlive empires.2 Throughout history, many 
empires were essentially about facilitating trade. For instance, in its review of Bernstein 
(2008), The Economist (2008) explains how the Athenian Empire was established to secure 
food trade:
The Athenians were driven by the dictates of trade to create, first, a powerful navy, 
and then, an empire. [...] Low rainfall and a mountainous topography made it impos-
sible for farmers to produce enough grain for a growing and increasingly city-based 
population. The Spartans and their allies looked west to Sicily, but the Athenians 
increasingly relied on access to the breadbasket of Pontus (modern Ukraine). This, 
in turn, meant keeping open those narrowest of choke points: the Dardanelles (to the 
Greeks, the Hellespont) and the Bosphorus. Other states in the region were just as 
dependent on the trade with Pontus, and were, therefore, prepared to contribute to 
the costs of Athenian naval operations. Before long, this “coalition of the willing” 
evolved into the Athenian Empire.
Findlay and O’Rourke (2009) provide many other instances of how facilitating trade was 
central to empires. The conquests of the Mongol Empire, for example, stabilized long-dis-
tance trade across Central Asia during a century known as Pax Mongolica. The Byzantine 
1 Other examples include Acemoglu et  al. (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2016), who trace the role of 
colonial institutions in explaining the prosperity of today’s countries, Nunn (2008), who shows that the 
slave trade had long-lasting damaging effects on African development, and Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 
(2015) who show that three vanished empires’ different religious practices and ideals persist in today’s 
Poland. See Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2017) for a comprehensive collection of short essays on the 
long shadow of history, Nunn (2009) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) for reviews of this literature, and 
Galor (2011) for a comprehensive account of deep-rooted factors in comparative development.
2 The concept was introduced by Head et al. (2010) who show that despite a gradual deterioration of trade 
links, colonial links still explain part of today’s trade flows. They suggest that a form of trade-enhancing 
capital that depreciates slowly over time could explain this persistence. A few studies on the role of history 
in world trade have also suggested that historical events that allow costs to be sunk can be associated with a 
persistent level of trade (Eichengreen and Irwin 1998).
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Empire organized trade across the Mediterranean and the Black Sea using imperial monop-
olies, strict controls, and written trade agreements known as Chrysobull.3 Other examples 
include the expansion of markets, trade, and specialization that occurred in China during 
the Song Dynasty, notably thanks to an extensive network of canals and waterways, and 
the lucrative trade in furs, silver and silk between the East and the West, which was made 
possible by the Vikings taking control of the Russian river systems. Perhaps even more 
obvious is the blend of trade, plunder, and settlement associated with colonial empires. 
The East India Company, initially only established for the pursuit of trade opportunities, 
was key to the creation of the British Empire in India. Colonial imperialism is indeed often 
based on the idea that trade follows the flag, or that trade flourishes only under a harmo-
nized polity. Colonial empires doubled trade within their controlled territories between 
1870 and 1913 by lowering transaction costs and establishing preferential trade policies 
(Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008).
We can, therefore, think of empires as entities that facilitated trade within their con-
trolled territories by building and securing trade and migration routes, and by spreading 
common norms, languages, religions, and legal systems. This led to the accumulation of 
imperial capital such as physical capital, e.g. roads, railway lines or canals; common insti-
tutions, e.g. common legal systems; business networks, e.g. commercial diasporas such as 
the Gujaratis in the British Empire; or cultural capital, e.g. common language, religion, 
and trust. These formal and informal institutions persist through time and affect today’s 
global economy. The Byzantine empire, for example, played a big role in the spread of 
roman law which still influences many legal systems today, and in the cultural spread of 
orthodox Christianity throughout the Byzantine commonwealth, from modern-day Greece 
to southwestern Russia. Historical Habsburg-Empire regions have higher current trust and 
lower corruption than neighboring regions, most likely due to the empire’s well-respected 
administration (Becker et  al. 2016), and countries of the Habsburg Empire trade signif-
icantly more with one another than what is predicted by the gravity model (Rauch and 
Beestermoller 2014). Similarly, Grosjean (2011) shows that 16th-18th century European 
empires explain social trust differences across countries. The formation of imperial capital 
may also come from the act of trading itself. Jha (2013) shows that local institutions that 
emerged to support inter-ethnic medieval trade have resulted in a sustained legacy of ethnic 
tolerance in South Asian port towns.4
To empirically study the legacy of empires, we collect novel historical data on the ter-
ritories controlled by 168 empires, from the Achaemenid Empire to the Yuan and Zand 
Dynasties. We then create an imperial capital measure at the country-pair level.5 Assuming 
that imperial capital grows between two countries when they are both controlled by the 
same empire but also depreciates with time, our measure takes into account all imperial 
history by considering years in and years since all common empires.
One way to understand our imperial capital measure is as a bilateral index akin to the 
state history index introduced by Bockstette et  al. (2002) and extended by Borcan et  al. 
3 A Chrysobull, or golden bull, was a written trade agreement, sealed with gold, that established trade pref-
erences across provinces of the empire. In 1082, for example, the Byzantine emperor issued a chrysobull 
to give Venetian merchants trade preferences. The Byzantine empire also had a trade manual, the book of 
Eparch, detailing merchant guilds, import regulations, and the setting of prices.
4 More examples on the emergence of such formal and informal trade-enhancing institutions can be found 
in Greif (2006).
5 We use a wide array of sources for data collection. These are empire-country specific and are listed in our 
online database. We provide more details on our data construction in the next section.
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(2018). While the state history index captures the history of individual state institutions in 
a location (or the characteristics of people who used to live there at a certain point in time 
as in Putterman and Weil 2010), our measure captures shared formal and informal institu-
tions and a common heritage between locations. Our imperial capital measure can hence 
function as a historically grounded indicator that captures the strength of a common past 
between countries today.
We include our measure of imperial capital into a gravity model to estimate its relation-
ship with trade today.6 Importantly, to isolate the effect of imperial capital from other geo-
graphic factors such as mountains, deserts or large water bodies that may affect both past 
empire expansions and today’s trade patterns, we account for a comprehensive measure of 
geographic barriers. To do so, we calculate the number of hours it would take a human to 
travel an optimal route between two countries (à la Özak 2010, Human Migration Index), 
and control for it in our regressions.
We find that long-gone empires have indeed left their mark on today’s trade patterns. 
A 10% increase in imperial capital is associated with an increase in bilateral trade of at 
least 1.15%.7 Doubling imperial capital corresponds to an increase in trade around 10%. 
Among countries with non-zero imperial capital, moving from a minimal imperial capital 
to a maximum one brings about a 36% increase in trade. Our findings are similar when we 
test alternative measures of imperial capital such as an indicator of whether two countries 
were ever part of the same empire, the number of years the two countries were in joint 
empires, and the number of joint empires they have been part of. Imports from countries 
that were once in a common empire are, on average, 55% larger than from other countries.
We also build a measure of deep imperial capital, i.e. imperial capital that depends on 
three characteristics of empires: a centralized administration, a centralized religion, and a 
monopoly on coin minting. We find that deep imperial capital, accumulated during empires 
particularly conducive to trade-enhancing harmonization, has even more explanatory 
power than our more general baseline measure of imperial capital. We additionally explore 
the heterogeneous effects across colonial and non-colonial imperial capitals and find that 
the latter matters almost as much in explaining today’s trade.
We then investigate to what extent institutional and cultural legacies such as shar-
ing a legal system, a language, or a religion may explain the persistence of past empires. 
We show that part of the relationship between imperial capital and trade (up to 50%) is 
explained by these historical bilateral affinity measures. Thus, a common imperial heritage 
6 Economists have been trying to understand international trade patterns at least since Adam Smith pub-
lished The Wealth of Nations in 1776. A series of explanations from comparative advantage to economies 
of scale and love of variety have been proposed and tested in the last 50  years (see, for example, Davis 
2000; Davis and Weinstein 2003; Chor 2010). A particularly robust empirical finding has been the gravity 
model of trade, which links trade between two countries to the geographic distance between them and to 
other bilateral trade costs such as diverging institutions or cultures (Tinbergen 1962; Head and Mayer 2014, 
2013).
7 One needs to be cautious in causally interpreting our estimates. Despite our efforts to control for the geo-
graphic factors that may be behind both trade and empire formation, omitted factors related to trade poten-
tial may still explain part of the relationship we document. In robustness checks, we attempt to attenuate 
this concern. We show that placebo empires determined by geography are not associated with trade today. 
In one specification, we include both an empire dummy and our measure of imperial capital to explain 
trade. This gets us close to a backdoor-criterion identification, i.e. once we control for selection into empires 
with the dummy variable, the intensity of treatment (imperial capital) is not affected by the omitted factors 
that affect both trade and empire formation. Nevertheless, it is important to keep this caveat in mind when 
interpreting the effect of imperial capital.
91Journal of Economic Growth (2020) 25:87–145 
1 3
is part of the reason why countries share institutions and culture, and this, in turn, has a 
persistent effect on trade.
While infrastructure such as roads (Michaels 2008), railways (Donaldson 2018), or tel-
egraphs (Steinwender 2018) do promote trade, Head and Mayer (2013) point out that trans-
port costs (and tariffs) do not account for most of the trade costs associated with borders 
and distance. Instead, they point to cultural and informational frictions as the main culprits. 
This is why cultural similarity (Felbermayr and Toubal 2010; Gokmen 2017) and trans-
national networks (Rauch and Trindade 2002) are so important to trade. Indeed, the latter 
facilitate trade by reducing contract enforcement costs and by providing information about 
trading opportunities (Rauch 2001). Our results suggest that imperial capital might play a 
similarly important role in reducing these frictions that inhibit international trade.8
Our paper is the first to estimate the relationship between all past empires and today’s 
trade patterns. While researchers have highlighted the role of colonial history in current 
trade (Head et  al. 2010), we add to the literature by demonstrating the influence of the 
entire universe of empires, particularly non-colonial ones, since 3000 BC. Our new com-
prehensive dataset documents empire-country relations for the whole world and throughout 
all history. A valuable contribution is also to make the entire universe of empire-country 
history available to researchers. We also build a dynamic indicator of imperial capital that 
accounts for both time in and time since joint empires, unlike previous studies on the effect 
of colonial empires which usually rely on dummy indicators. This paper also advances our 
understanding of historical legacies by focusing on the case of international trade. While 
there is much evidence that empires played an important role in shaping institutions and 
culture, we highlight how empires also shaped bilateral affinities between countries and 
how these, in turn, influence world trade, which we know is a major driver of economic 
growth (Feyrer 2009; Pascali 2017; Donaldson 2018; Wahl 2016).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our data and empiri-
cal strategy. In Sect. 3, we discuss the results. Sect. 4 concludes.
2  Data and empirical strategy
2.1  Empire data and imperial capital
To construct our measure of imperial capital, we collect data on the geographic expansion 
and shrinkage of 168 empires from a wide array of sources.9 Our full list of empires and 
sources are available online at https ://www.wnver meule n.com/empir es/. Some key sources 
are Turchin (2009), Euratlas-Nüssli, the Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civilizations 
8 This does not rule out that imperial legacies also affect trade via infrastructure such as road networks. We 
know from Volpe Martincus et al. (2017) that roads from the pre-columbian Inca Empire explain today’s 
roads locations and in turn Peruvian firms’ exports. Also, Pinna and Licio (2017) argue Roman roads have 
a similar impact on Italy’s foreign trade, and Fluckiger et al. (2019) argue that the Roman transport network 
has effects on the intensity of bilateral investment today.
9 We follow, as closely as possible, Encyclopedia Britannica’s definition of an empire: Empire, major 
political unit in which the metropolis, or single sovereign authority, exercises control over territory of great 
extent or a number of territories or peoples through formal annexations or various forms of informal domi-
nation. We also attempt to be as encompassing as possible. We acknowledge that researchers use various 
definitions in practice (see, for example Turchin 2009), however, different selection criteria are unlikely to 
alter our results.
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from Harvard, the Centennia Historical Atlas, the New Cambrigde Economic History Atlas 
by Darby and Fullard, Encyclopedia Britannica, the Encyclopedia of Empire (Mackenzie 
2016), as well as a range of empire specific sources.10
This data collection allows us to match each empire’s territory to today’s countries, 
whether covered in whole or partially, and during which years. For example, the Empire of 
Trebizond covered parts of today’s Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine from 1204 to 1461. The 
Great Moravian Empire was spread over today’s Czechia and Slovakia from 833 to 906, 
while it also covered parts of Poland from 877 to 894. Table 20 in “Appendix 3” gives an 
overview of this dataset.11
Based on our database, we build an indicator of imperial capital capturing both time 
in and time since a joint empire, to fully capture the heterogeneity of imperial legacies.12 
We conjecture that spending 100  years in a joint empire 2000  years ago does not mat-
ter as much for today’s trade relationships as spending 100 years in the Habsburg Empire 
only 200 years ago. Our measure of imperial capital, thus, needs to discount the number of 
years spent in an empire by the time elapsed since then. Hence, we assume that imperial 
capital builds up in times of empires, when trading relationships are formed, common insti-
tutions established, and roads built, but that this capital, like all forms of capital, depreci-
ates over time.
To construct our measure of imperial capital, we are inspired by the state history index 
introduced by Bockstette et al. (2002) and extended by Borcan et al. (2018). We build it 
such that in times of a common empire imperial capital increases by 1 unit per year, and 
over time it depreciates by 0.1% per year.13
Algebraically, we can represent the dynamics of imperial capital, Eij,t , as follows:
(1)
Eij,t = Eij,t−1 × (1 + 훿)
−1 + Vij,t,
Eij,0 = 0,
10 We would like to note that Wikipedia has been a great resource for our initial exploration and data col-
lection, notably the “list of empires”. Other online sources such as Running Reality, an on-line application 
that maps the history of human civilization from 3000 BC to today, and WorldStatesmen.org, an online 
encyclopedia of the leaders of nations and territories, have been very useful as well. On top of multiple 
rounds of verification of each empire-country data entry by three specialist research assistants, we also 
stress-tested our data set via emails to more than 180 historians across the world, and with a dozen of face-
to-face meetings with historians at our universities. This was a serious effort of crowd-sourcing. With the 
full dataset now online, we invite researchers to explore the data, make suggestions for improvement, and 
use it freely in their own research.
11 We do not differentiate between the size of the countries’ areas covered by the empires. One reason for 
this choice is that the location of empire boundaries is sometimes imprecise. Another is that we prefer not 
to assume an arbitrary cutoff to the size of a country’s area covered by an empire for that country to be con-
sidered part of an empire. While larger areas could be associated with stronger imperial capital today, dis-
tinct cultural or ethnic groups in border regions could also have a large effect on cross-border trade. Hence, 
we include countries as part of empire even when only a part of the country’s area is covered by the empire.
12 We can create various measures of shared imperial past at the country-pair level, such as an indicator of 
whether two countries were ever contemporaneously part of the same empire, the number of years the two 
countries were in joint empires, or the number of joint empires they have been part of. Our aim here is for 
our measure to simultaneously account for both time in and time since a joint empire.
13 We follow Borcan et  al. (2018) in choosing these accumulation and decay parameters. Borcan et  al. 
(2018) suggest a decay rate of 5% per period of 50 years, which is equivalent to 0.1% per year. We use a 
range of different decay rates, from 0.01 to 1%, in robustness checks (see Table 17 in the “Appendix 1”).
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for country pair ij where Vij,t is a vector of length T indicating whether a country pair ij is 
in a common empire in year t or not.14 The parameter 훿 is the annual depreciation rate of 
imperial capital.
Implicitly, in building this measure, we assume that every empire contributes identically 
to imperial capital. Yet, different empires with different institutions or different deepness 
may contribute differently to the accumulation of imperial capital. To capture this poten-
tial heterogeneity, we also build a measure of deep imperial capital, taking into account 
three features of empires that may be associated with long-lasting imperial capital. These 
are: (1) a centralized administration (king), (2) a central and dominant religion (god), (3) 
a monopoly on the minting of coins (although these did not exist before 700 BCE) (coin). 
We conjecture that these three characteristics are likely to be associated with institutions 
and trade, and thus, conducive to the accumulation of imperial capital.
A centralized administration is presumably linked to the development and harmoniza-
tion of formal institutions and infrastructure. One example here is the Annona, i.e. the sys-
tem used by the central government in the Roman empire to supply its cities with grain 
imported from North Africa, using some 5000 ships in three rotations (Laiou and Mor-
risson 2007). Another example is the vast road network built across the Inca empire using 
tunnels and suspension bridges. The latter’s use was strictly limited to the government who 
controlled long-distance trade. Not all empires had an all-powerful centralized adminis-
tration however. The Kingdom of Funan in Southeast Asia for instance relied on a man-
dala system of governance, i.e. a network of states with diffuse political power. As for the 
spread of norms and culture, they might have been facilitated by a dominant religion. The 
Inca empire might have contributed to the building of mutual trust through cultural prac-
tices such as ayni, i.e. a concept of reciprocity in exchange, based on Inca cosmology, and 
still practiced among tribes in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The cultural spread of orthodox 
Christianity throughout the Byzantine commonwealth, from modern-day Greece to south-
western Russia, can also explain part of the mutual trust between these countries today. 
The role of coin minting monopolies in trade reflects more directly the role of the impe-
rial government in controlling and fomenting trade across regions. The Byzantine coin is 
known as the dollar of the middle ages for this reason (Lopez 1951).
We thus build our measure of deep imperial capital such that it increases by 1 in a year 
of common empire if these three features are present. If the empire has no such feature, 
there is no capital accumulation. If it has one feature out of 3, capital increases by 0.33, and 
if it has 2, by 0.66.15
We also build a measure of imperial capital that takes into account only the countries’ 
relationship with the metropole, the country where the central authority was located. The 
idea here is that the metropole played a primary role in spreading imperial capital to its 
provinces while the integration of provinces together did not occur to the same extent. The 
colonial relationship dummy often included in gravity regressions similarly usually cap-
tures only the relationships with the metropole.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of these three different measures of imperial capital 
between Egypt and Iraq. The two countries have been part of many joint empires over the 
last 3000  years including the Neo Babylonian Empire, the Umayyad Caliphate, and the 
Ottoman Empire. As explained above, we hypothesize that imperial capital grew during 
15 In Eq. (1), Vij,t takes the values of 0, 0.33, 0.66, and 1, to reflect the deep capital characteristics.
14 T = 4500 − 1 , for the number years from present day to the first empire, 2500BC, such that the Vij,1 cor-
responds to the year 2500BC for country-pair ij, and Vij,T the last year of simulation (2000).
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those years while it depreciated over time. The bars show the periods of common empire, 
and their height captures the number of deep empire characteristics. For example, since the 
metropole of the Ottoman empire, present-day Turkey, was neither in Egypt nor in Irak, 
Metropole imperial capital does not increase during that empire. The slow erosion of impe-
rial capital shows how it can persist over time and still influence trade today.
Figure 2 shows the inflows of imperial capital for the world as a whole over time. In 
other words, it shows how many country-pairs see their common imperial capital increase 
each year, and how imperial capital has grown over time with the inclusion of more and 
more countries. It also illustrates how most accumulated imperial capital is deep impe-
rial capital. What this figure clarifies is that empires became a world phenomenon around 
500BCE. Before that time, empires existed but were limited at the global level, which does 
not imply that such early empires are irrelevant for the countries that were part of it. After 
500BCE, we see a number of expansions and declines. The period 600-1400 shows a level 
of stability at the global level, and after a short trough, we see a massive growth that we 
can associate to the European colonial expansion. Colonial empires collapsed around 1950, 
and no new empires emerged after that. We choose not to include more modern federative 
entities such as the Soviet Union or the European Union. In our data, imperial capital, thus, 
depreciates until 2000.
Table 1 gives examples of imperial capital between countries that have a shared imperial 
history. The pair with the highest imperial capital is Syria—Turkey. France and Germany 
have shared 9 empires in the past, yet, their imperial capital is below that of India and 
Sri Lanka, which have shared only 5 empires. This illustrates how the number of shared 
empires may not matter that much if these were short-lived and a long time ago. We also 
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Fig. 1  The dynamics of imperial capital between Egypt and Iraq. Notes Example of imperial capital for two 
countries, Egypt and Iraq. Imperial capital grows by one unit for each year that the two current day coun-
tries are, at least partially, covered by a common empire. Capital depreciates continuously by 0.1% per year, 
which is roughly 5% per 50 years. The deep imperial capital line differentiates capital accumulation using 
three empire characteristics, summarized by ‘King’, ‘God’, and ‘Coin’. Each characteristic gives an impe-
rial capital amount of 0.33 per year, with the maximum of 1 for all three characteristics. The metropole line 
takes into account only the years when one of the two countries is considered the metropole, or the adminis-
trative center, of the empire
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have pairs like Canada and France, which have been part of only 1 common empire but 
have a high level of imperial capital left.
The distribution of our measure of imperial capital is illustrated in Fig. 3, which also 
shows the negative relationship between imperial capital and bilateral geodesic distance 
across countries. While more than 70% of country-pairs have no imperial capital, 9399 
country-pairs have accumulated some of it since 2350 BCE.
2.2  Trade data and gravity variables
The workhorse model of trade relations between countries is the gravity model, which 
links trade between two countries to the geographic distance between them and to other 
bilateral trade costs such as diverging institutions or cultures (Tinbergen 1962; Head and 
Mayer 2013, 2014). The model can be summarized as follows:
where mij is the average imports of country i from country j in the 2000s.16 We take the 
inverse hyperbolic sine rather than the log of imports to include country-pairs with zero 
bilateral trade.17 The parameters 훼i and 휎j are importer and exporter fixed effects. The vari-
able Eij is the amount of imperial capital accumulated between countries i and j. The set 
of baseline bilateral control variables, Xij , includes contiguity, distance, and differences in 
latitudes and longitudes. We also control for the ease of human mobility using an index à 
la Ömer Özak’s Human Migration Index (Özak 2010), which we detail in the next section. 
These control for the tendency of natural obstacles such as mountains and deserts to act 
as a barrier to trade and empire expansion, as many empires expanded geographically by 
pushing their borders further and further. We follow Abadie et al. (2017) and cluster stand-
ard errors, 휖ij , by country-pairs.18
All our data that is not related to empires is from standard sources. Trade data comes 
from UN Comtrade. Other variables such as common legal system, language, religion, and 
trade agreements, among others, are taken from the CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago 
2011).
2.3  Accounting for geographic barriers
While the literature most often uses bilateral geodesic distance to capture trade costs 
between countries in gravity equations, we can be more precise in measuring the geo-
graphic factors that can act as barriers to trade and empire expansion.
(2)asinh
(
mij
)
= 훽Easinh
(
Eij
)
+ 훽X(Xij) + 훼i + 휎j + 휖ij,
16 The choice of an average for the 2000s maximises the country coverage compared to picking any year in 
the 2000s. Doing the latter does not change the results.
17 The asinh function is defined at zero and is otherwise similar to the natural logarithm function. We 
thus interpret our coefficients as proportional effects, i.e. as in log-log models. See Burbidge et al. (1988); 
MacKinnon and Magee (1990) for details on the asinh function, Kristjánsdóttir (2012) for an application to 
the gravity equation, and Card and DellaVigna (2017) for another example.
18 Here we deem what is important is to cluster at the level of our treatment. Since imperial capital is sym-
metric, we have two observations treated by the same level of imperial capital. Our identifying variation is 
thus half the size of our number of observations.
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If two countries are separated by a natural border such as a mountain range, or large 
water bodies, trade costs as well as invasion costs are likely to be high. Such geographic 
barriers may thus reduce the likelihood that two countries trade and that they were ever 
part of a joint empire. They may explain the geography of past empire expansion and still 
directly impact trade today. Therefore, we need to control for the ruggedness of land and 
the difficulty of crossing large bodies of water to better identify the effect of imperial capi-
tal on today’s trade. Geodesic distance may not control for such natural barriers to trade 
and empire expansion as accurately as a measure taking into account the ease of human 
movement.
To control for these natural barriers to trade and empire expansion, we calculate the 
number of hours it would take a human to travel an optimal route between two points, à 
2
4
6
8
2500BCE 1000BCE 1CE 1000CE 1950CE
time
Imperial Capital Deep Imperial Capital Metropole Imperial Capital
Fig. 2  Inflows of imperial capital across the world over time. Notes The figure shows the sum of imperial 
capital additions by year, for the entire world (in asinh). It measures the new capital globally gained. An 
increase indicates existing empires expanding or new empires emerging, with the consequence that more 
countries are associated to historic empires. The differentiation between ‘deep capital’ and ‘metropole’ is as 
given in the text and illustrated in Fig. 1
Table 1  Examples of imperial 
capital between countries Country pair Nb of empires Imperial capital
Syria Turkey 27 7.48
Greece Bulgaria 10 7.43
India Sri Lanka 5 7.43
Israel Egypt 20 7.42
Iran Iraq 26 7.39
France Germany 9 7.15
Myanmar Russia 4 6.28
Canada France 1 5.78
Morocco Equatorial Guinea 1 4.43
Guatemala Belize 1 3.03
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la Ömer Özak’s Human Migration Index (Özak 2010).19 Optimal routes are the quickest, 
where time required is ruled by a version of the so-called Naismith’s rule of walking time 
required with sloping paths. The rule takes into account that individuals walk slower the 
steeper the slope, which holds for both ascent and descent, but is asymmetric at 5 degrees 
angle (walking down at 5 degrees slope is faster than zero degrees, but walking up is 
slower). When a slope is steeper than 12 degrees, a walker typically will take a detour and 
find a more lengthy route.20
To cross small water bodies, such as rivers, we add additional 3 h. For ocean crossings, 
we follow Pascali (2017) and take into account wind speed and direction. Global ocean 
wind speeds come from NASA (2012). We take the average speed and direction for the 
months of May to August for the years 1999–2009. The speed of a vessel given wind speed 
and direction of travel is that of a clipper as documented in Pascali (2017) (see Fig. 10 in 
“Appendix 2” for an illustration of wind speed and directions). We add 24 h (three days 
based on 8 h of walking per day) for boarding and unloading. In our benchmark version, 
seafaring is limited to 200  km within coasts (so crossings from Europe over the Atlan-
tic Ocean were not possible before the end of the Middle Ages). The idea is to create a 
0
2
4
6
8
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pe
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l
4 6 8 10
Log distance
Fig. 3  Imperial capital. Notes This scatter plot correlates imperial capital with geodesic distance and the 
solid line is a linear fit. Sources: CEPII, and authors’ empire data
19 Another project that models ancient travel times is the Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the 
Roman World. For our project, we required a global scope, and therefore, devised our own network.
20 The precise cost function (in hours) is:
When a slope exceeds 12 degrees, the distance is extended such that we reach the same height but over a 
longer path at a 12 degrees angle. So, at a flat surface walking speed is 5 km/h, at 5 degrees descent it is 
6 km/h, and ascent it is 4.2 km/h.
cost(angle) = distance∕speed = (height∕ sin(angle))∕
(
1000 ∗ 6 ∗ e(−3.5∗| tan(angle)+0.05|)
)
.
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geographic barrier measure that is valid for all the years covered by our data. We then use a 
second travel time measure where ocean sailing is possible.21
Figure  4 illustrates how geography impacts human mobility around the Caspian Sea. 
The Caspian Sea itself poses a barrier to trekking, however, once at sea, sea travel is faster. 
Mountains lengthen travel time. For example, the Caucasus had a strong influence in shap-
ing the raids of the Rus in the 10th century (Afandiyeva 2018) and still influence the loca-
tion of oil and gas pipelines in the 20th century around the Caspian Sea. More generally, 
Fig. 9 in “Appendix 2” gives an overview of the optimal route network we estimate for the 
entire world.
In our empirical analysis, we use both geodesic distance, to stay in line with the stand-
ard gravity model, and our measure of human migration hours, to adapt the gravity equa-
tion to our empire-history setting. We also build additional variables that capture trek 
obstacles (as the ratio of human mobility on land over geodesic distance), or trek obstacles 
and bad winds (as the human mobility including seafaring divided by geodesic distance). 
In “Appendix 2”, we provide further statistical details on the human mobility measures as 
well as their correlation with geodesic distance. By and large, the correlation is high, but it 
varies over distances.
While we assume that a rugged path between countries inhibited their trade and ham-
pered the expansion of empires, it does not necessarily imply that ruggedness itself or 
geographic obstacles was bad for empires. Indeed, the presence of mountains along many 
coastlines around the Mediterranean provided easier defense against invaders, as well as 
natural harbours, forest resources, and a better climate.22
21 To implement the above measures, we create a grid of nodes at the global level, one for land and one 
for water. The distance between all nearest nodes are calculated using a projection-free method in order to 
avoid distance distortion from any particular projection at the global level. Information on elevation, from 
which we can derive angles between any two points, are obtained from a global digital elevation map. The 
grid of nodes has an average distance of around 5km on land and 50km on seas. At a global level this 
results in millions of nodes. In order to reduce the number of potential routes between any two countries, 
we first calculate the optimal route between the nearest (current day) major cities. The distance between 
two countries is the average distance between all pairs of cities from these two countries. Calculations are 
executed in PostGIS, code and results will be available on the authors’ websites.
22 Understanding what causes the rise of empires in the first place, and the role of geography in this pro-
cess, is a weighty question beyond the scope of this paper. Economics literature does not provide a work-
horse theory of empire formation. It does provide some insights based on papers on the optimal size of 
nations and the location of borders. For example, Alesina et al. (2000) suggest that country size in equi-
librium might be the result of a tradeoff between lower trade costs and cultural heterogeneity. The idea 
that enhancing trade is behind the formation of empires is clearly present in this literature. Huning and 
Wahl (2016) suggest that within the Holy Roman Empire states with a geography more favorable for taxa-
tion were financially more stable, geographically larger, and survived longer. This is in line with geogra-
phy affecting the incentives for a larger empire and a larger tax base. A recent attempt to provide a theory 
of empire formation is by Peter Turchin. In Turchin et al. (2006), he confirms that we know little on the 
preconditions for the rise of large empires. He then suggests that across 62 mega empires in history, there 
is a statically significant tendency for empires to expand more along the east-west axis than north-south. 
Turchin (2009) notes that location near a steppe frontier correlates with the frequency of empire formation. 
This is because antagonistic interactions between nomadic pastoralists and settled agriculturalists may pres-
sure both group to scale up polity size, and thus military power. Empire formation can also be seen though 
the lens of state capacity and what social scientists in general know about the role of agriculture in its 
origins. A recurring hypothesis is indeed that the surplus generated by a productive and varied agriculture 
allowed for the emergence of state institutions (see Mayshar et al. 2016, for a discussion of this hypothesis). 
It is hence likely that geographic variables might have played heterogeneous roles across empires and in the 
way they affected trade. What we have found in the data is that trek obstacles, as captured by the human 
walking hours to distance ratio, are negatively correlated with imperial capital, as they are with trade. We 
also found that, on average, differences in temperature, precipitation, or suitability for agriculture, are nega-
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3  Results
In this section, we bring our newly collected data on empires and our measure of imperial 
capital to the gravity model.
3.1  Baseline results
Table  2 shows our baseline gravity regression results. In these specifications, we only 
include geographic gravity controls, i.e. geodesic distance, a contiguity dummy, differences 
in latitudes and longitudes (absolute values), as well as our measures of human mobil-
ity, ruggedness and bad winds. All non-dummy control variables are in logs. We keep the 
Fig. 4  The optimal route network around the Caspian Sea. Notes The figure represents a part of the global 
routing map, indicating optimal routes between various cities. The color codings indicate the speed at each 
section, which depends on altitude difference between the start and the end point of a section. Mountain-
ous areas in the east and the south coincide with increased travel time. Note that the Caspian sea itself is a 
barrier, as there are limited cities immediately near the sea, and the change of mode (from land to sea voy-
age) is assumed to be costly. However, sea travel tends to be much faster, and therefore efficient at longer 
distances. The distance and travel time for each route between two cities is indicated next to each route. 
Our mobility index (mob) indicates the ratio of travel time of the route to a hypothetical travel time along 
straight line at a constant speed of 5 km/h. The figure only includes one way links for clarity, while the 
underlying data takes into account the variation in slopes going either direction (Color figure online)
tively correlated with imperial capital as well as with trade today. This goes against that idea that different 
locations with possible gains from trade from specialization in their comparative advantage would be more 
likely to form an empire to reduce trade costs.
Footnote 22 (continued)
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baseline specifications parsimonious with controls that are truly exogenous to trade today. 
We add other determinants of trade, such as common religion, common legal system, or 
trade agreements, later on when we examine the underlying mechanisms of the imperial 
capital effect.
Across the board, we find a positive and significant relationship between imperial capi-
tal and trade that is robust to various geographic controls. In specifications 3–10, when we 
control for our measures of geographic barriers, the number of observations is smaller, 
yet, the results on imperial capital are very similar.23 This suggests that natural obstacles 
to trade and empire expansion do not drive the explanatory power of an imperial past on 
trade. However, we do find negative and statistically significant effects of bad geography 
on trade, as expected.
As for the magnitude of the estimates, our lower bound of 0.115 suggests that a 10% 
increase in imperial capital is associated with an increase in bilateral trade of around 
1.15%, our upper bound suggests a corresponding increase of 1.69%. Doubling imperial 
capital is associated with a 8.2–12.4% increase in trade ( 20.115 to 20.169 ). Among countries 
with at least some imperial capital, moving from a minimal imperial capital to a maximum 
one brings about a 36% increase in trade.
Another way to think about this persistence is to consider what happens after a breakup 
when imperial capital starts depreciating at 0.1% a year. Forty years after a breakup, impe-
rial capital should decrease by 1 − 0.99940 , i.e. about 4%. According to our upper bound 
estimate, this would imply an approximate 0.7% drop in trade. This is much smaller than 
what Head et al. (2010) estimate for colonial empires. They find that trade has declined by 
around 65% after four decades of independence. We thus estimate a much stronger per-
sistence than what was found for recent colonial empires. We further discuss the differ-
ence between colonial and non-colonial imperial capital later in this section. But, first, we 
assess the robustness of our estimates to alternative specifications and measures of imperial 
capital.
3.2  Robustness to alternative measures of imperial capital
To further assess the robustness of the long-run persistence of empires, we estimate our 
gravity model using alternative measures of imperial capital. We first use a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the two countries were ever part of the same empire. This dummy 
captures the existence of a shared imperial past but not the level of imperial capital accu-
mulated between two countries. It lacks the ability to differentiate between long-gone and 
recent empires but allows for estimating the average legacy of a common imperial history. 
As other indicators of imperial capital, we also use the number of common empires coun-
tries have been part of, as well as the total number of years countries have spent in com-
mon empires.
Results using these alternative indicators are in Table  3. Imports from countries that 
were once in a common empire are on average 55% larger than from other countries 
(asinh(0.58)). These results confirm the relevance of past empires in shaping today’s trade 
patterns. The results for the other indicators of imperial capital indicate that 10% more 
years of common empire are associated with an increase in trade of around 1.02%, while 
23 The number of observations is smaller because some country-pairs are separated by more than 200 km 
of water and this precludes them to be connected by land human migration. See Fig. 9.
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an extra empire is associated with an 6.2% increase in trade. It is worth noting that none of 
these indicators take into account both years in and years since past empires, and hence, 
our preference for our measure of imperial capital.
To verify that the estimated coefficient on a common empire indeed captures a common 
history and not simply geographic proximity, we run a falsification exercise. To do so, we 
generate 100 placebo Empire dummy distributions, based on geography, where the prob-
ability of two countries being in a joint placebo empire is a function of walking hours on 
natural optimal routes. More precisely, we generate placebo Empire dummies using a bino-
mial draw, with probability parameter equal to the inverse of the walking hours between 
countries (multiplied by three so as to match the true share of empires among country-
pairs, which is around 30%). In other words, for each country pair, the placebo Empire 
dummy is equal to either 1 or 0, and the probability of that dummy being 1 is determined 
by geography. Our placebo dummies can thus be seen as a re-shuffling of Empire dummies 
across country-pairs, but where the shuffles are not completely random. We then estimate 
the effect of these placebo Empire dummies using the gravity specification of column (1) 
of Table 3. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the 100 coefficients on placebo Empire dum-
mies. The mean of placebo estimates is centered around zero, and no placebo dummy has a 
statistically significant relationship with trade. Also, the right tail of the distribution of the 
estimated placebo effects is nowhere near our lower bound estimate for the Empire coef-
ficient. This exercise assures us that the coefficient on a common imperial past is more than 
a reflection of geography.
As an extra robustness check, we re-run our baseline specification while including the 
empire dummy on top of our imperial capital variable. In this specification, the empire 
dummy accounts for selection into empire, while the parameter on imperial capital cap-
tures the intensity of treatment. Results are in Table 4. We find that, among country-pairs 
that have shared empires in the past, those that have accumulated more imperial capital 
trade more today. The results confirm the relevance of our measure of imperial capital in 
capturing additional information on countries’ common history beyond just having been 
part of the same empires. This result is further illustrated in Fig. 6. It shows how the effect 
of a common imperial past depends on how much imperial capital has been accumulated, 
i.e. it depends on how long the periods of common empire lasted, and how many years 
ago this was. Being in a common empire a long time ago or for a short period of time only 
increases trade by around 20%, while it increases it by as much as 75% if the country pair 
has accumulated large amounts of imperial capital.
In Tables  5 and  6, we use two alternative measures of imperial capital we described 
in Sect.  2, namely deep imperial capital and metropole imperial capital. We find deep 
imperial capital to have a slightly larger coefficient than our baseline measure of impe-
rial capital, confirming the relevance of centralized administrations, religions as well as 
coin minting in building imperial capital and shaping trade today. When we include both 
deep imperial capital and our baseline measure in the same regression, we find that it is 
only deep imperial capital that matters. On the other hand, we find that it is not only the 
relationships with the metropole that contributes to the accumulation of relevant imperial 
capital. When we include both measures in our regressions, we find that metropole impe-
rial capital has a positive and significant coefficient but about half as large as that of our 
baseline measure of imperial capital, which takes into account links between all regions of 
an empire.
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In “Appendix 1”, we provide a number of extra robustness checks, such as estimating 
a non-linear effect of imperial capital on trade, including extra geographic controls such 
as differences in suitability of agriculture across countries, using a normalized version of 
imperial capital (normalized as the index of state history in Borcan et al. (2018)), using dif-
ferent rates of depreciation for imperial capital, as well as estimating the effects of imperial 
capital accumulated during different periods.
3.3  Observable imperial legacies
In Table 7, we look at the association of imperial capital with bilateral measures of affin-
ity to explore the potential observable imperial legacies through which imperial capital 
affects trade today. Such measures of bilateral affinity are often included in gravity models 
to capture institutional and cultural barriers to trade. However, many of these attributes, 
e.g. sharing a language, a legal system, or a religion, are a reflection of a shared history that 
presumably relates to a shared empire. To investigate the relationship between measures of 
affinity and imperial capital, we employ gravity-type regressions and control for geodesic 
distance, contiguity, differences in latitudes and longitudes, and trek obstacles (Panel a) or 
trek obstacles and bad winds (Panel b). Importantly, in columns (1)–(3) of Panels a and b, 
we confirm that country-pairs with greater accumulated imperial capital are more likely 
to share a legal system, a language, and a religion. This is in line with the idea that these 
measures of affinity capture part of the imperial heritage countries share. Our measure of 
imperial capital is also negatively correlated with linguistic distance, but not significantly 
with genetic distance. Preferential trade policies might be another mechanism through 
Lower bound
estimate of the effect
of a past common
empire on trade
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
−.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Empire effect on trade
Distribution of the effect of 100
placebo empires  on trade
Fig. 5  Placebo estimations. Notes The effects of placebo empires are estimated in a specification akin to 
that in column (1) of Table 3. The placebo empires are randomly predicted conditional on human mobility 
between countries. See text for details
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which imperial capital may affect trade. The accumulation of imperial capital could indeed 
be related to better political relations today, which in turn lead to free trade agreements that 
boost trade. We find no robust relationship between imperial capital and the probability of 
a free trade agreement. Hence, it is unlikely that the effect of imperial capital is via current 
trade policies.
It is clear that a common imperial heritage is part of the reason why countries share 
institutions and culture, and why this, in turn, has a persistent effect on trade. Nonetheless, 
the persistent effect of empires on trade is not entirely captured by these gravity variables. 
Indeed, results in Table 8, using imperial capital, and Table 9, using the empire dummy 
variable, confirm that the coefficient on imperial capital is still positive and significant 
when we control for these historical legacies.24 The effect of imperial capital is around 
50% smaller when these variables are controlled for (e.g. comparing columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 8), suggesting that observable historical legacies account for about half of the impe-
rial capital effect. Similarly in Table 9, the difference in imports between empire pairs and 
non-empire pairs is reduced to 25%, suggesting that around 60% of the dummy effect is 
explained by these observables.
To sum up, the legacy of imperial capital partly reflects empires’ unifying influence 
on common languages, religions, or legal systems. These measures of affinity may be the 
result of past common empires, and may, thus, be viewed as components of imperial capi-
tal. At the same time, even though controlling for them does indeed reduce the size of the 
imperial capital effect, part of the effect still remains unexplained. One possible explana-
tion is that the comparative advantage forces that have shaped empire expansion in the past 
are still at play today in shaping trade patterns. This would imply that the effect of imperial 
capital is partly spurious. While we cannot completely rule out this possibility, it would not 
explain why longer periods of joint empire have a stronger effect on trade, which is in line 
with our idea of imperial capital as a trade facilitator.
3.4  Heterogeneity across colonial and non‑colonial imperial capital
We further explore the differential persistence of colonial and non-colonial empires. 
Colonial empires have been studied previously by both development and trade econo-
mists, and the colony dummy is now a staple of gravity equations. It is therefore impor-
tant to check how our measure of imperial capital differs between colonial and non-
colonial empires.
We describe the differences in levels of colonial and non-colonial imperial capital in 
Table 10. Out of 26,816 country-pairs, 9399 share an imperial past and none of these 
have seen imperial capital depreciate completely. Out of these 9399 country-pairs, 4743 
have colonial capital and 4439 have non-colonial imperial capital (some pairs have 
both). The level of imperial capital is slightly higher on average when accumulated 
during non-colonial empires. Among country-pairs with a shared imperial history, the 
mean of colonial capital is 4.70, while it is 5.38 for non-colonial imperial capital.
To explore the differential relationships the two types of imperial capital may have 
with today’s trade, we run our gravity regressions including both variables at the same 
time on the right hand side. Results are in Table  11. We find that both colonial and 
non-colonial imperial capital have a positive and significant relationship with trade. On 
24 Including genetic and linguistic distances as controls drastically reduces the number of observations.
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average, the effect of one standard deviation increase in colonial capital is about twice 
as large as that of non-colonial capital. Colonial empires clearly matter for today’s trade, 
but long-gone non-colonial empires matter as well. This also assures us that our results 
are not driven merely by colonial empires. To additionally confirm that colonial empires 
do not drive our results, we run further regressions excluding all country-pairs with pos-
itive colonial imperial capital. Results in Table  12 confirm that, among country-pairs 
that were never part of joint colonial empires, imperial capital accumulated during long-
gone empires still has a positive effect on trade.
4  Conclusion
In Power and Plenty, Findlay and O’Rourke (2009) suggest that “contemporary globaliza-
tion, and its economic and political consequences, have not arisen out of a vacuum, but 
from a worldwide process of uneven economic development that has been centuries, if 
not millennia, in the making.” In this paper, we show empirically that there is indeed a 
persistent legacy of long-gone historical empires affecting a crucial element of globaliza-
tion, international trade. Imports from countries that were once in a common empire are on 
average 55% larger. Hence, the historical legacy of empires clearly left its mark on today’s 
trade patterns. We look into the dynamics of persistence by building a measure of impe-
rial capital that buildups in times of common empire and depreciates over time. Its slow 
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Fig. 6  How the legacy of empires depends on imperial capital. Notes The effect of an empire past is 
obtained by adding the coefficient on imperial capital multiplied by imperial capital to the coefficient on the 
empire dummy. The estimates are from column (2) of Table 4. The dashed lines give the 90% CI and the 
inverted-u dash line gives the distribution of imperial capital, among pairs that share an empire past
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Table 10  Colonial versus non-
colonial imperial capital Obs. Mean SD Min Max
All observations
Empire 26,816 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Imperial capital 26,816 1.80 2.54 0.00 7.48
Non-colonial imperial capital 26,816 0.89 2.08 0.00 7.48
Colonial imperial capital 26,816 0.83 1.84 0.00 6.57
Only positive observations
Empire 9399 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Imperial capital 9399 5.12 1.18 0.47 7.48
Non-colonial imperial capital 4439 5.38 1.42 0.46 7.48
Colonial imperial capital 4743 4.70 1.02 0.60 6.57
Table 11  Colonial and non-colonial imperial capital and modern trade
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level. Non-dummy variables are in inverse hyperbolic sine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Colonial capital 0.152*** 0.137*** 0.173*** 0.137*** 0.152***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Non-colonial capital 0.037*** 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Distance − 1.659*** − 1.659*** − 1.861***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.046)
Trek hours − 1.385***
(0.034)
Trek and sail hours − 1.466***
(0.046)
Trek obstacles − 0.876***
(0.057)
Trek obstacles and bad winds − 0.588***
(0.059)
Contiguity 0.847*** 0.943*** 0.832*** 0.828*** 0.717***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.140) (0.133) (0.134)
Latitude diff. 0.003 − 0.109*** − 0.147*** − 0.036** − 0.005
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Longitude diff. − 0.010 − 0.028 − 0.295*** 0.048** − 0.014
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
N 26808 26466 26808 26466 26808
R-sq 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.81
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erosion explains the persistence of long-gone empires. Imperial capital influences trade 
beyond imperial legacies such as common languages, religions, legal systems, and impor-
tantly, beyond the ease of natural trade and invasion routes. This suggests a persistent and 
previously unexplored effect of long-gone empires on trade. Our paper thus contributes to 
an emerging literature on long-run legacies by looking at the case of empires and persistent 
trade patterns. While we only looked at trade patterns in this paper, Fig. 7 suggests that 
countries which have shared empires with many countries over many years are richer today. 
This makes for promising future research, especially given previous research suggesting a 
positive effect of isolation on innovation and prosperity (Ashraf et al. 2010; Özak 2018).
Table 12  Omitting pairs with colonial imperial capital
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level. Non-dummy variables are in inverse hyperbolic sine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Imperial capital 0.101*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.096***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance − 1.422*** − 1.464*** − 1.664***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.053)
Trek hours − 1.245***
(0.041)
Trek and sail hours − 1.408***
(0.051)
Trek obstacles − 0.804***
(0.066)
Trek obstacles and bad winds − 0.788***
(0.068)
Contiguity 0.918*** 1.009*** 0.787*** 0.897*** 0.723***
(0.179) (0.177) (0.178) (0.176) (0.177)
Latitude diff. 0.020 − 0.085*** − 0.095*** − 0.020 0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Longitude diff. − 0.030 − 0.051** − 0.184*** 0.012 − 0.027
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
N 22067 21845 22067 21845 22067
R-sq 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
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Appendix 1: Extra robustness checks
In this section, we provide a number of extra robustness checks.
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Fig. 7  Imperial capital and GDP per capita today. Notes This graph shows the correlation between GDP per 
capita and imperial capital. GDP per capita is in Purchasing Power Parity and is from the World Develop-
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In Table  13, we estimate non-linear effects of imperial capital on trade. Instead of 
including our continuous measure of imperial capital, we use dummies that capture 
weather the country pair is within the top 25% among pairs with imperial capital, or 
among the bottom 25%, or in the middle 50%. The reference group is country-pairs 
with no imperial capital. We find positive and significant effects for these three dum-
mies. The effect of being in the bottom 25% of imperial capital is, across specifications, 
smaller than the effect of being in the top 25% or the middle 50%. Being in the top 25% 
seems to have the biggest effect on trade. The magnitude of the coefficients confirm the 
relevance of measuring the intensity of common imperial pasts.
In Table 14, we check how robust our results are to extra geographic controls such as 
differences in temperature, precipitation, and suitability of agriculture across countries. 
While the number of observations goes down due to data availability, our coefficients on 
Table 14  Imperial capital and modern trade (Extra geographic controls)
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Imperial capital 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.147*** 0.116*** 0.121***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance − 1.434*** − 1.473*** − 1.681***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.057)
Trek hours − 1.321***
(0.043)
Trek and sail hours − 1.400***
(0.056)
Trek obstacles − 0.992***
(0.071)
Trek obstacles and bad winds − 0.744***
(0.072)
Contiguity 1.087*** 1.080*** 1.029*** 1.013*** 0.913***
(0.144) (0.142) (0.148) (0.142) (0.144)
Latitude diff. 0.071*** − 0.026 − 0.038* 0.018 0.059**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Longitude diff. − 0.027 − 0.018 − 0.202*** 0.023 − 0.029
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Temperature diff. − 0.010*** − 0.014*** − 0.012*** − 0.012*** − 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Precipitation diff. − 0.002 0.003 − 0.013*** 0.002 − 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Agro−suitability diff. − 0.212** − 0.197** − 0.128 − 0.200** − 0.163*
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
N 18878 18597 18878 18597 18878
R-sq 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
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imperial capital are not affected. We find that differences in temperature and agro-suit-
ability reduce trade, which goes against the idea that countries with more pronounced 
differences in comparative advantage would trade more.
In Table 15, we disaggregate trade along Rauch (1999)’s classification of products into 
homogenous, listed (or reference-priced), and differentiated products. The data here is 
from Melitz and Toubal (2014). Rauch (1999) show that proximity, common language, and 
colonial ties matter more for trade in differentiated products as search and contract-enforce-
ment costs are larger for this type of trade. Here our aim is to check if imperial capital is 
also mostly associated with trade in differentiated products. We find no large differences 
in coefficients across product categories. Imperial capital is slightly more correlated with 
trade in homogenous goods.
In Table 16, we use a normalized version of imperial capital, normalized in the same 
way as the index of state history in Borcan et  al. (2018), where the maximum imperial 
capital is 1. The coefficients here can hence be interpreted as the effect of going from no 
imperial capital to the maximum level. Our lower bound results suggest that this increase 
in imperial capital more than doubles trade.
In Table 17, we check how sensitive our results are to the rate of depreciation of imperial 
capital. In our baseline, we followed Borcan et al. (2018) and assumed a decay rate of 0.1% 
per year, but it is possible that imperial capital depreciates much slower, or much faster. 
Table 15  Imperial capital and modern trade (by Rauch’s trade classification)
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Differentiated Listed Homgenous Listed Differentiated Homgenous Rauch total
Imperial 
capital
0.107*** 0.110*** 0.132*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.130*** 0.109***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Distance − 1.446*** − 1.489*** − 1.225*** − 1.709*** − 1.499*** − 1.458*** − 1.551***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.054) (0.049) (0.041) (0.059) (0.043)
Trek 
obsta-
cles 
and bad 
winds
− 0.644*** − 0.155*** − 0.679*** − 0.481***
(0.061) (0.052) (0.073) (0.055)
Contigu-
ity
1.135*** 1.358*** 1.443*** 1.202*** 1.098*** 1.279*** 0.960***
(0.120) (0.129) (0.133) (0.128) (0.120) (0.134) (0.121)
Latitude 
diff.
− 0.049*** − 0.001 − 0.040* − 0.006 − 0.050*** − 0.046** − 0.014
(0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015)
Longi-
tude 
diff.
0.048** 0.010 − 0.044 0.005 0.047** − 0.050* 0.014
(0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020)
N 21614 21614 21614 21614 21614 21614 21614
R-sq 0.84 0.76 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.67 0.82
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The consequence of different depreciation rates is potentially both in the set of countries 
pairs that have non-zero imperial capital, and in the distribution of those which have. To 
investigate how these differences in depreciation rates would affect our results on the effect 
of imperial capital on trade, we ran our baseline speciation using six other depreciation 
rates, from 0.01% a year to 1% a year. We find a positive and significant effect for all these 
rates, suggesting the choice of depreciation parameters is not crucial in our specification.
In Table  18, we estimate the effects of imperial capital accumulated during differ-
ent periods. We find positive effects of imperial capital accumulated during all periods 
except during 500–1000 AD, possibly reflecting a dark period of imperial history. We 
also find that capital accumulated during 2000BC to 0AD matters as much as capital 
accumulated in the last 500 years [columns (2)–(4)].
Finally in Table  19, we focus only on country-pairs that have been in common 
empires. All these country-pairs have positive imperial capital today. We find a positive 
and significant coefficient on imperial capital in 9 out of 10 regressions, confirming that 
the level of imperial capital matters beyond having just some imperial capital.
We also investigate whether all empires have a positive effect on trade. Some empires 
lasted longer than others, some existed a long time ago, and some were better than others 
Table 16  Imperial capital and modern trade (Normalized index)
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Normalized capital 1.305*** 1.607*** 1.449*** 1.342*** 1.108***
(0.183) (0.181) (0.187) (0.181) (0.183)
Distance − 1.705*** − 1.713*** − 1.898***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.045)
Trek hours − 1.444***
(0.034)
Trek and sail hours − 1.503***
(0.046)
Trek obstacles − 0.932***
(0.057)
Trek obstacles and bad winds − 0.539***
(0.060)
Contiguity 0.707*** 0.799*** 0.738*** 0.695*** 0.615***
(0.141) (0.140) (0.149) (0.138) (0.140)
Latitude diff. 0.014 − 0.112*** − 0.158*** − 0.032** 0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Longitude diff. − 0.005 − 0.015 − 0.311*** 0.060*** − 0.009
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
N 26808 26466 26808 26466 26808
R-sq 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.81
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at building imperial capital. For this additional exercise, we include 168 indicators, one 
for each empire, to estimate the effect of each empire individually.25 Figure 8 presents the 
30 most influential empires. Interestingly, the Hotaki Dynasty and Rashidun Capiphate, as 
well as the Belgian Colonial Empire, have the biggest effects. Other top-30 empires include 
the Akkadian Empire in the Middle East, the Lozi Empire in Southern Africa, and the 
Inca Empire in South America. The French and Italian colonial empires are also among 
the top 30 empire effects. It is important to note that the magnitudes of the empire effects 
are smaller than that of the general empire dummy. This is because the latter often cap-
tures the aggregate effect of many successive empires. Moreover, the counterfactual in this 
exercise is not country-pairs that have never been in a common empire, but rather country-
pairs which have been in different empires at different points in time. This explains why 
Table 17  Imperial capital and modern trade (Sensitivity to decay rates)
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Decay .01% 0.105***
(0.007)
Decay .02% 0.107***
(0.007)
Decay .05% 0.112***
(0.007)
Decay .10% 0.121***
(0.007)
Decay .20% 0.137***
(0.008)
Decay .36% 0.154***
(0.008)
Decay 1.0% 0.192***
(0.010)
Distance − 1.599*** − 1.598*** − 1.596*** − 1.594*** − 1.593*** − 1.607*** − 1.642***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Contiguity 0.864*** 0.862*** 0.856*** 0.845*** 0.817*** 0.768*** 0.724***
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
Latitude 
diff.
0.031* 0.031* 0.030* 0.029* 0.025 0.019 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Longitude 
diff.
− 0.019 − 0.019 − 0.018 − 0.017 − 0.014 − 0.008 − 0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
N 26808 26808 26808 26808 26808 26808 26808
R-sq 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
25 We are able to estimate 155 coefficients due to collinearity.
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in this specification, out of 155 empires, 75 have positive effects on trade, 80 have a nega-
tive one, and the mean effect is zero. This specification also makes it hard to identify the 
separate effects of empires which covered similar territories but over different periods, as 
these empire dummies are highly correlated. Overall, this reinforces our dynamic imperial 
capital methodology which allows us to capture the aggregate effect of successive empires.
Table 18  Imperial capital and modern trade (Imperial capital at different times)
Importer and exporter fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered by 
country-pair, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% 
percent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports
Capital 2000 BC-0 AD 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.037* 0.054*** 0.037**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Capital 0 AD-500 AD 0.018 0.027* 0.014 0.018 0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Capital 500 AD-1000 AD 0.005 0.007 − 0.011 0.005 − 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Capital 1000 AD-1500 AD 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.018 0.035*** 0.030***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Capital 1500 AD-2000 AD 0.072*** 0.031*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.067***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Distance − 1.834*** − 1.824*** − 2.041***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.045)
Trek hours − 1.508***
(0.033)
Trek and sail hours − 1.630***
(0.046)
Trek obstacles − 0.897***
(0.059)
Trek obstacles and bad winds − 0.595***
(0.059)
Contiguity 0.885*** 1.000*** 0.986*** 0.861*** 0.784***
(0.137) (0.138) (0.143) (0.136) (0.136)
Latitude diff. − 0.018 − 0.141*** − 0.193*** − 0.055*** − 0.026
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Longitude diff. 0.014 − 0.019 − 0.318*** 0.071*** 0.009
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
N 26808 26466 26808 26466 26808
R-sq 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.81
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Appendix 2: Further details on bilateral distance measures
Once you have ships, tunnels, canals, cars, and trains, human mobility becomes more and 
more correlated with geodesic distance, which is the standard control in gravity regres-
sions. One reason it is the standard is that geodesic distance is an exogenous measure of 
trade costs. It captures many bilateral obstacles other than transport costs which can be 
endogenous to trade and to technological developments. Indeed, it captures information 
and cultural frictions even when technology allows you to go everywhere. Yet, our cur-
rent geographic measures of human mobility allow us to show that natural obstacles such 
as ruggedness and bad winds still have an impact on trade. They also allow us to capture 
geographic determinants of empire expansion. Indeed, it is clear that wind direction played 
a key role before steam power in determining why countries were more likely to trade and 
become part of empires (Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009; Pascali 2017). Geodesic distance on 
the other hand does not really explain European colonization patterns. For these reasons, 
we think our human mobility variables are quite useful in our context. Below, we provide 
summary statistics showing how human mobility relates to geodesic distance. The code to 
replicate the human mobility measures is available here: https ://www.wnver meule n.com/
empir es/routi ng_tutor ial.html
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Neo-Sumerian Empire
Kara-Khitan Khanate
Lozi Empire
Sikh Empire
Italian Colonial Empire
Inca Empire
Ghurid Dynasty
Maravi Empire
Saffarid Dynasty
Khwarezmid Dynasty
Delhi Sultanate
Jin Dynasty
Songhai Empire
Middle Assyrian Empire
French Colonial Empire
Buyid Dynasty
Mongol Empire
Golden Horde
Mongol_Empire
Kara-Khanid Khanate
Median Empire
Ghaznavid Dynasty
Ayyubid Dynasty
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Effect on trade
Fig. 8  Top 30 empire effects. Notes The effect of individual empires are estimated in a specification akin to 
that in column (1) of Table 3
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We differentiate between two historic distance measures, one where sailing is limited to 
within 200km of coastlines, and one where this limitation is relaxed. The limitation pro-
hibits cross-ocean links which effectively captures the barriers that oceans formed until 
technological advances for such voyages had been reached in the 16th century.
Figure 9 gives an overview of the optimal route network we estimate without seafar-
ing. The shades of the routes vary from red (slow) to green (fast). Generally, we see that 
mountainous regions imply a slower walking speed or large detours. Figure 10 shows 
a selection of optimal sailing routes across oceans, with indicators of prevailing wind 
speed and wind direction. The optimal route takes into account the prevailing wind 
speed, wind direction and the angle of sailing relative to the wind direction. Informa-
tion on global ocean winds come from NASA (2012). The sailing speeds given wind are 
taken from Pascali (2017). Routes were selected between continents, e.g. from Europe 
to America and Africa, and Africa to Asia. So the fastest voyage from Europe to Asia 
would go through South Africa. Voyages in the Pacific Ocean are allowed but not indi-
cated in the figure. 
Our measures of geographic barriers to human mobility are thus the number of hours 
it would take a human to trek across lands, or sail across oceans, via these optimal 
routes. As shown in Fig. 11, travel hours are correlated with ‘as the crow flies’ distance. 
And, at large distances, seafaring reduces travel time by a large factor. Importantly this 
Fig. 10  Major shipping routes and wind patterns. A selection of optimal sailing routes across oceans, with 
indicators of prevailing wind speed and wind direction. The optimal route takes into account the prevailing 
wind speed, wind direction and the angle of sailing relative to the wind direction. Information on global 
ocean winds come from NASA (2012). The sailing speeds given wind are taken from Pascali (2017). 
Routes were selected between continents, e.g. from Europe to America and Africa, and Africa to Asia. So 
the fastest voyage from Europe to Asia would go through South Africa. Voyages in the Pacific Ocean are 
allowed but not indicated in the figure
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correlation is not uniform over distances, as presented in Fig. 12. At longer distances, 
geographic obstacles matter less as they can be avoided, and this is especially true with 
seafaring. Thus, travel hours over long distance are quite correlated with geodesic dis-
tance. On the other hand, geographic obstacles such as mountains might have a large 
effect on travel hours over short distances, reducing the correlation between travel hours 
and distance.
We observe a high correlation at short distances, probably, as those observations consist 
of routes with few geographic obstacles. Over large distances, we observe a big difference 
in correlations with and without seafaring. This is because walking distances are largely 
affected by water bodies over larger distances and having to take a giant detour around an 
ocean will create a big discrepancy between walking and ‘flying’. The ability to sail, there-
fore, allows to get relatively closer to the ‘flying’ distance.
Appendix 3: Empires, characteristics, countries and dates
In Table  20, we present the dataset we collected using numerous sources and with the 
help of many historians. Full sources are available online, including a more convenient 
data structure for download and future research, at https ://www.wnver meule n.com/empir 
es/. The table is sorted chronologically by starting date of Empire. An asterisk indicates the 
country that contains the capital, or metropole or administrative center, of the empire.
The three characteristics ‘King’, ‘God’, and ‘Coin’ indicate answers to the following 
questions.
Trave
l time
 cons
istent
 with 
5km/h
0
2500
5000
7500
20000150001000050000
Travel distance in km
T
ra
ve
l h
ou
rs
walking walking and sailing
Fig. 11  Geodesic versus travel hours. The 5  km/h line simply divides the number of kilometers on the 
x-axis by 5 to find the corresponding number of travel hours
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King: Does the empire have an absolute ruler, at least nominally? This acknowledges 
that real political power may be more diffuse in reality. Most empires would have this 
property.
God: Did the empire have a centralised religion, where the ruler, at least nominally, 
drew power from or was head of the religion within its territory? This does not necessitates 
that other religions are not allowed within the empire. All caliphates and some European 
empires are designated as such.
Coin: Did the empire have a central mint controlled by the ruler.
See the main text for the reasoning behind these three characteristics.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
403020100
1,000 km walking distance bins
travel hours − geodesic distance travel hours with sailing − geodesic distance
Fig. 12  Correlations between geodesic and travel hours by distance bins
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